In this paper, I propose a general framework called Epistemic Logic (EL) which captures a full range of epistemic phenomena, and apply it to the three-valued interpretion of natural language sentences. Further, I mention the ability which EL implies, i.e. treatment of indexicals, relationship to Data Semantics etc.
Syntax of Epistemic Logic
The syntax of Epistemic Logic consists of a normal version of first-order predicate logic with modal operators may' and 'must' which is defined as follows: Auxiliary symbols of formulas are eliminated in obvious cases.
Semantics of Epistemic Logic
The Semantics of Epistemic Logic consists of the epistemic model which is constructed from extensional model structures via extensional models.
Extensional Model Structure
I start from the traditional well-known relational structure for the interpretation of first-order formulas which is found e.g. in Bridge(1977) : (3) = (A, {RI} iER j),JE { F l}kEK(0,/EL, {cm}mEm)
Here, ki is the i-th j-ary relation, is the k-th l-ary function, and c m is the m-th constant. But to simplify (3) , I omit functions and constants so that (3) looks like as follows:
On the other hand, I complicate (4) by replacing relations with attributes and their extensional functions for reasons explained in 2, and call it an extensional model structure: Const -0 Ind, Fred" Attrn
Epistemic Model
The Epistemic Model is defined as follows:
(7) Epistemic Model:
Here, M is the set of extensional models with the same domain and set of attributes.
The elements of M are called situations.
Entity of EL
The set Ent of entities of EL is defined parallel to Exp as follows: The set Inf C Ent of infons of EL is the least set which satisfies the following conditions: Parentheses of infons are eliminated in obvious cases.
Interpretation
Natural language sentences are translated to the corresponding formulas of EL. However, the latter are not directly interpreted, but translated to the intermediate entity of EL, i.e. infons, which are then interpreted w.r.t. a situation, and their semantic behaviors are explained. d E Ind, and x E Par. Then, r(x) (A, V are supremum and infimum function respectively.) ii)
In the following, in f, in fi ,in f2 E Inf . M(c, 7r, .) r Inf is the partial function Inf --+ {1, 0} defined as follows:
In the following, x E Par.
(7r' is an arbitrary parameter assignment.)
is omitted in unnecessary cases. The interpretation of in f E In f always begins with c(c,inf).
Interpretation of EL formulas (14)
Exp Ent is called the translation function of Exp to Ent w.r.t. M, and defined as follows:
According to the above definition of 4m, elements of W Exp and WEnt correspond to each other as follows:
WExp WEnt individual constant individual individual variable parameter n-ary predicate symbol n-ary attribute logical connective logical operator quantification symbol quantifier auxiliary symbol parentheses formula infon
We represent (1)m(a) with a (a E Const), and (Dm(pred) with pred (pred E Pred). So, the notational difference between an expression of EL and the corresponding entity is that terms and predicates in the former are represented in roman characters, whereas the corresponding general individuals and attributes in the latter are represented in italicized characters. But the former is a string of symbols, the latter is an semantic entity.
form E Form is interpreted w.r.t. s (c, .), M(c,.) and M(c, 7r, .) as follows: First, the semantic correspondence of terms appears as individuals in infons, which represents the (alternative) opinion of Kripke(1972) , Kaplan(1977 Kaplan( ,1978 Kaplan( ,1989 f and Ext enables the following distinction: Intuitively, the third truth value 'neutral' appears just in the case that an utterance is interpreted as neither true nor false. But the meaning of 'false' is not so clear. As to Type I, it should be understood as the predicate negation, so that the three-valuedness of (25i) w.r.
t. M, 7r is formulated as (26) i) M, r yellow(capitalism) ii) M, it 156 yellow(capitalism)
Here, we assume 
Ind\ (Ext(yellow) U Ext(yellow)) = yellowN, yellow = yellow,
and call yellow+ , yellow -, yellow N the positive, negative, and neutral domain of yellow respectively. And the individual capitalism belongs to yellow N so that the truth value 'neutral' is assigned to (25i). As to (25ii), we assume that PXYZ) is undefined. Then, tkm(XYZ(naomi)) = t. But, according to (13iia), M(c,r, t) is undefined, i.e. neither true nor false.
As to (25iii), suppose that s = {M1 , M2 } such that (25iii) is true w.r.t. M1 , but it's false w.r.t. M2. Then,
And, (25iii) is interpreted as neutral w.r.t. s. There is a certain difference between the three-valuedness of Type I, II and Type III. The former appears w.r.t. an extensional model, but. the latter appears w.r.t. a situation. As we see from (10), s(c,inf) is interpreted in a modal fashion, i.e. in order to determine the truth value of in f w.r.t. s, we must refer to several extensional models. For this reason, we call the former types of three-valuedness the non-modal three-valuedness, the latter the modal three-valuedness. But this modality should not be understood in the traditional modal logical manner, because s(c, in f) is not determined w.r.t. other "possible worlds", but w.r.t. extensional models in s. So, we call this kind of modality "epistemic modality".
In order to enable an three-valued interpretation, we must a bit modify (10), (12) and (13ii) The interpretation of in f which (30) presents is defined in the following manner:
Hierachy of Epistemic Modality
But (30) is not the complete form of three-valued interpretation yet. There remains a possibility to extend its epistemic modal part, which is recognized by the following comparison of (simplified two-valued) interpretations:
Signed Formula of Hintikka: Here, we find three kinds of negation: (v), (-, 0, F), and (-0. And this corresponds to the tripartite distinction of neustic, tropic, and phrastic part of a sentence utterance discussed in Hare(1970) and Lyons(1977:749pp.) . According to them, an utterance of a sentence can be analyzed as follows:
And I-say-so part, it-is-so part, and prop part (i.e. the propositional content of the sentence) are called neustic part, tropic part, and phrastic part respectively. The three kinds of negation are applied to these respective parts, i.e.:
Hare neustic negation tropic negation phrastic negation Epistemic Model 10 --. Situation Semantics V 0 -, Signed Formula V F -,
Then the extended form of (30) so as to include the neustic part looks like as follows:
Here, NP, TP, PP E {T, T, N, N, NP, TP, and PP are truth values of neustic, tropic, and phrastic part respectively, and S E Pow (Pow(M)).
The neustic part of (36) 
Contraction of Neustic and Phrastic Part to Two-valuedness
In (30), the three-valuedness proper to EL is the tropic part, i.e. the three-valuedness caused by epictemic modality. So, we focus on the tropic three-valuedness, omit higher-order neustic parts, and contract the neustic and phrastic part to two-valued interpretation. But then, the tree-valued interpretation of the tropic part is expressed using neustic and phrastic negation as follows:
The phrastic part is contracted to two-valued form as follows. First, we treat the neutral case in Type I and II in (29) as false. Next, we omit the phrastic N _, N, identify T, F and F, T on the right hand side of (31) with 1 and 0 respectively, further, T, F and F, T on the left hand side with c (empty string) and respectively. Then we can totally eliminate the phrastic part.
The two-valued interpretation of neustic part consists of (37i,ii). Further, we assume that S = {s}. respectively. I.e., the neustic T and T are identified with and 15A respectively.
But then, considering (18), (32) and the two-valuedness of M(ir, in f), the interpretation of infons is expressed using be and without tropic part as follows:
Data Semantic Modality and Epistemic Logic
In (25iii) and (28), we could neither say that it was gold, nor it wasn't gold. Here, let s = c for simplicity. Then, according to the definition in 1.4.1, we certainly say that (41) It may be gold, w.r.t. s. Further, we can say that (42) He must be a honest guy. Fig.1 w.r.t. the situation s such that, for every M E s, (42) without 'must' is true. Such 'may' and 'must' reduce the interpretation to two-valuedness, insofar as in f in epmod in f is defined. But, as (13.1i) indicates, they do not represent traditional possible world semantic modalities, but data semantic' modalities disucussed in Veltman(1981 Veltman( ,1985 , Landman(1986) .
I shortly consider the relationship between Data Semantics and EL.
Disjunctive sentences
In the situation of (25iii), we certainly say (43) It's gold, or it's not gold.
In general, we can have the following situation:
But the interpretation of disjunctive sentences poses a problem on Data Semantics. Because, in Data Semantics, the disjunction is interpreted in the following manner:
But then, in the situation of (44i,ii), (44iii) cannot be the case. In order to avoid this, Data Semantics assumes that the disjuncitive sentence in the above situation is interpreted with may. I.e.: Because 'in f V -"in is a logical truth, M in f V -"in f for all M E s. So, s in f V -"in f . This is an advantage of constructing a situations out of extensional models.
The whole story is illustrated as Fig.1 . Here, the whole figure represents the lattice structure of 9/t with the top element M . And, The crucial defect of Data Semantics consists in the non-existence of 'disjunctive' situations such as sit(in f V -"in f) which exist in Epistemic Model that enable the latter to treat disjunctive sentences straightforwardly.
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